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REGIONAL SELECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN SCOTLAND: 
DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO PLANT 
PRODUCTIVITY? 
 
John Moffat 
Economics, Finance and Accounting, Durham University Business School, 
Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, UK. Email: john.moffat@durham.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal impact 
on plant TFP. To tackle the problem of self-selection into the treatment 
group, propensity score matching is employed. In order to control for the 
endogeneity of other variables in the model, estimations are performed 
using the system GMM estimator. The results show that for low technology 
manufacturing, receipt of an RSA grant leads to a fall in TFP. 
 
JEL classifications: D24, J24, L52, L60 
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Introduction 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) is the largest and oldest 
business support scheme currently operating in Scotland. On average, 
almost £50 million (2003 prices) of RSA grants were offered and accepted 
in Scotland per annum between 1973 and 2003. This is far larger than 
expenditure on other schemes such as the Small Firm Merit Awards for 
Research and Technology (SMART) and Support for Products under 
Research (SPUR) schemes for which the average value of grants offered and 
accepted per annum during the period of operation was £568 thousand and 
£809 thousand respectively.  
RSA provides grants to plants undertaking investment projects in 
economically deprived ‘Assisted Areas’1. Eligible investment includes 
expenditure on land, buildings, plant, machinery and software. As a 
component of regional policy, the scheme is principally designed to 
safeguard and generate employment in the Assisted Areas. As such, many of 
the grants are given to help foreign firms establish plants in Scotland.
2
 The 
amount that can be offered is determined by a number of factors including 
                                                 
1
 The map of assisted areas is developed by the UK and devolved governments in 
accordance with EU regional aid guidelines. 
2
 According to the most recent annual summary, 26% of the accepted offers in 2010/11 
were made to foreign-owned companies while 52% of the total value of accepted offers 
went to foreign-owned companies (Scottish Enterprise, 2011). 
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the location and size of the project and the number of jobs it will create or 
safeguard. In order to receive an RSA grant, an additionality criterion must 
be satisfied which requires that awards will only be made if the project 
could not have proceeded in the same form and time frame without the 
grant. A displacement criterion must also be met which demands that the 
jobs created by the project must not be offset by job losses in other Assisted 
Areas in Scotland.  
This paper examines whether receipt of an RSA grant has a causal 
impact on plant total factor productivity (TFP) in Scotland using a dataset 
created by merging the Selective Assistance Management Information 
System (SAMIS), a register of RSA recipients dating from 1972 when the 
scheme began, into the longitudinal Annual Respondents Database (ARD). 
This is an important question given the importance of productivity in 
determining living standards.
3
 If RSA grants merely support plants that 
would otherwise be forced to close, these subsidies may impede the 
Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’ that creates growth in the 
economy by shifting resources from low to high productivity plants 
(Schumpeter, 1943). On the other hand, if the resources previously 
                                                 
3
 According to Krugman (1997), in the determination of living standards, ‘productivity isn’t 
everything but in the long run, it is almost everything’. Similarly, Baumol (1984) states that 
‘it can be said without exaggeration that in the long run probably nothing is as important for 
economic welfare as the rate of productivity growth’. Empirical evidence showing the 
importance of productivity is provided by the OECD (2003). 
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employed by the plant would be redundant after closure of the plant, the 
subsidy would make a positive contribution to growth in the economy. 
TFP is used instead of labour productivity because it is a better 
measure of efficiency and technology and will therefore be a stronger 
determinant of plant performance. Furthermore, labour productivity, unlike 
TFP, is determined by factor input levels in addition to levels of efficiency 
and technology (Harris, 2005). Receipt of a grant will have a positive 
impact on the employment of capital and labour because, in the case of 
capital, grants are only provided after expenditure on capital has occurred 
and, in the case of labour, ‘clawback’ clauses dictate that grants must be 
returned if employment targets are not met. This is shown empirically by 
Criscuolo et al. (2009). The impact of RSA on labour productivity will 
therefore be determined jointly by its impact on employment, capital and 
TFP and will therefore be difficult to interpret. 
The analysis is conducted separately for the high-tech, medium high-
tech, medium low-tech and low-tech sectors of the economy. Such a 
disaggregation is necessary because different sectors will operate with 
different production technologies and the impact of RSA is therefore likely 
to differ across sector.  
RSA may have both positive and negative impacts on TFP. Harris 
(1991) argues that there are two main channels through which an RSA grant 
may improve TFP. The first is by allowing the acquisition of modern capital 
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which requires the reorganisation of the plant along more efficient lines. For 
example, movement to a new plant, the acquisition of new machinery or 
investment in information and communication technology may trigger a 
wholesale reorganisation of production processes which will have an impact 
on TFP. An RSA grant may also raise TFP by allowing the plant to create a 
new product that can be produced with greater efficiency than older product.  
On the other hand, RSA may have a negative impact on TFP if firms 
can increase their profits by accepting the grant and increasing their use of 
capital and labour beyond the point at which they would operate if they did 
not receive the grant. In this situation, the grant can be regarded as 
compensation from the government to the firm for the loss of profits that the 
firm would incur from operating at a point with sub-optimally high 
employment.  
Previous studies have generally failed to find a statistically 
significant impact of receipt of an RSA grant on productivity. One 
exception is Harris and Robinson (2004) who, using a control group 
consisting of all untreated plants in Great Britain (GB), find a positive and 
statistically significant impact on TFP for RSA recipients throughout GB for 
the period, 1990-1998. However, when the model is estimated using a 
control group drawn from untreated plants from the assisted areas, they find 
that it is only RSA recipients in Scotland that received a large TFP boost. 
Their results also confirm that plants assisted by RSA are a self-selected 
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group of the population of plants which have lower than average 
productivity before receiving the grant. Criscuolo et al. (2009), using ARD 
data covering the period, 1988-2003, do not find a significant effect of RSA 
on either labour productivity or TFP in GB using an instrumental variables 
strategy. Finally, Hart et al. (2008), using the control functions approach on 
cross-sectional data taken from a telephone survey of Scottish firms, do not 
find a positive impact of receipt of an RSA grant on labour productivity. 
While the latter two papers use appropriate methods to tackle the 
consequences of self-selection into the treatment group, they fail to deal 
with the endogeneity of other explanatory variables in the model. Harris and 
Robinson (2004), by contrast, do not employ a sufficiently sophisticated 
method to control for self-selection but do control for the endogeneity of 
control variables. The strategy below addresses both sources of bias. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 sets out the  
methodology; section 3 describes the data; section 4 provides the results and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
Methodology 
 Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(1) ,KME ititititit KMEAY
   
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where Yit is gross output in plant i at time t, Eit represents employment, Mit is 
intermediate inputs, Kit represents the capital stock and Ait is TFP. Taking 
natural logs of equation (1) gives: 
(2) ,ititKitMitEit akmey     
where the lower case is used to denote the natural logarithm of a variable. 
 It is postulated that the natural logarithm of TFP can be modelled as 
follows: 
(3) ),( itiitATTitXit Dxa     
where xit is a vector of variables thought to influence TFP (in which 
continuous variables are logged) and Dit is a dummy taking the value of one 
if a plant receives an RSA grant in that period or has done so in the past. 
The error term is composed of ηi, an unobservable, plant-specific, time-
invariant effect and νit, a TFP shock. The RSA dummy is the key variable in 
the model as its coefficient, βATT, will provide the estimate of the impact of 
receiving an RSA grant on TFP. 
 The model is therefore: 
(4) ).( itiitATTitXitKitMitEit Dxkmey    
The group of observations that receive ‘treatment’ are said to be self-
selected when the decision of whether or not to receive ‘treatment’ is taken 
by the plant. In such a situation, the ‘treatment’ group is not a random 
sample of the population and will have characteristics that would lead to 
better or worse performance than observations in the ‘untreated’ group, in 
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the event that neither group received treatment. A comparison of the mean 
of an outcome variable across the ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ groups will then 
not provide an unbiased estimate of the average effect of ‘treatment’ on the 
‘treated’ (ATT) (see, for example, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009, for a 
more detailed exposition of self-selected bias).
4
 
Assuming that all relevant characteristics are observed, differences 
in characteristics across ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ groups can be controlled 
for using a correctly specified regression. However, in practice, finding the 
correct specification is difficult. This is a serious problem as estimating an 
incorrectly specified equation will generate biased estimates of the 
‘treatment’ effect because the estimate of the dependent variable for 
‘treated’ plants, in the event that they did not receive ‘treatment’, is entirely 
dependent on the specification of the model for values of the covariates for 
which only ‘treated’ plants are observed (see, for example, Blundell et al., 
2005). One solution to this problem is to create a matched sample in which 
‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ plants are observed for all values of the covariates. 
This is done here using propensity score matching (see Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002) which creates a sample that includes plants that received a grant and a 
                                                 
4
 Note that the decision of whether or not a grant application is successful is taken by a 
governmental body. However, this does not alter the fact that the ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
group will have different characteristics. Indeed, if the government tries to choose 
‘winners’, it will increase the likelihood of ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ groups having different 
characteristics. 
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sub-set of plants which did not receive a grant but which have 
characteristics that are similar to the treated plants. This is accomplished by 
estimating a probit model of ‘treatment’ status including variables that 
determine both output and whether a plant receives an RSA grant, and then 
matching on the estimated predicted values.
5
 This approach will improve the 
match, or the balance, of the covariates across ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
groups. The advantage of propensity score matching over other forms of 
matching is that it overcomes the difficulties of matching on a large number 
of variables (Zhao, 2004).
6
 
The matching estimator, as commonly described (see, for example, 
Blundell et al., 2005), suggests that, once a matched sample has been 
constructed, a simple regression of the outcome variable on the ‘treatment’ 
dummy will provide an unbiased estimate of the ‘treatment’ effect. 
However, even within a matched sample, it is possible that large differences 
in the distribution of the covariates across ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
observations may remain. This suggests that covariates ought to be included 
in the outcome regression to control for residual differences in the covariate 
                                                 
5
 Variables that determine output but not receipt of an RSA grant and variables that 
determine receipt of an RSA grant but not output are excluded because they do not cause 
differences in the value of the outcome variables across treated and untreated groups. 
6
 Propensity score matching is performed in Stata 9.2 using the ‘psmatch2’ command 
developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
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distribution across ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ groups. This approach is 
therefore a combination of matching and regression.
7
 
Having constructed a matched sample, difficulties remain in the 
estimation of (4) due to the potential for simultaneity and attrition bias.
8
 
Simultaneity bias arises because plants may have some knowledge about the 
value of the productivity shock and use this knowledge to choose the level 
of inputs in the production function (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). 
Attrition bias is present if plants base their exit decisions on their 
productivity level. As plants with a larger capital stock will be able to 
withstand lower productivity levels, this will generate a negative correlation 
between the productivity shock and the capital stock variable. Although the 
main variable of interest is the RSA dummy, it is essential to deal with the 
endogeneity of other explanatory variables if an unbiased estimate of the 
ATT is to be obtained. This point is made forcefully by Frölich (2008) who 
shows that the asymptotic bias of the estimate of the treatment effect can be 
large if the endogeneity of other variables in the model is ignored. 
Therefore, the coefficients in equation (4) will be estimated using the 
system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) (see Bond, 
                                                 
7
 Such an approach is recommended by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) over the simple 
matching estimator in their survey of the literature. 
8
 Van Beveren (2007) lists other potential sources of correlation between factor inputs and 
the error term. 
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2002 for an introduction). This estimates the equation as a system, using 
lagged levels and lagged first differences of the endogenous variables as 
instruments for the equations in first differences and levels respectively.
9
 
The endogenous variables in the model that will be dealt with in this way 
are employment, intermediate inputs and capital. It is assumed that the 
variables in xit and Dit are exogenous
10
. 
 
Data 
The ARD is a longitudinal dataset containing financial variables 
such as investment, intermediate inputs and gross output collected at the 
reporting unit (or establishment) level on the basis of a stratified sampling 
frame. Other variables such as employment are given for all reporting units 
and plants (or local units) (see Griffith, 1999, and Robjohns, 2006 for more 
information on the ARD). When a plant cannot provide the full range of 
financial information necessary for the survey, another plant within the firm 
will report on their behalf and the reporting unit then consists of more than 
                                                 
9
 This estimator is implemented in Stata 9.2 using the ‘xtabond2’ command developed by 
Roodman (2005).  
10
 The possibility that plants have unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the 
treatment dummy is not considered here. The existence of such characteristics would 
invalidate the conditional independence assumption (see e.g. Blundell et al, 2005), upon 
which this approach is based and cause biased estimates of the treatment effect. 
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one plant. When a plant can provide the required information and only 
reports on behalf of itself, the reporting unit consists of only one plant. 
The nature of the ARD presents two issues that need to be addressed 
when estimating the impact of receiving an RSA grant. Firstly, the reporting 
unit is not an appropriate unit of analysis for estimating the impact of RSA 
grants because RSA is awarded to support investment in specific plants 
rather than throughout the enterprise. Secondly, the reporting unit is an 
accounting rather than an economic unit. As such, the number of plants 
covered by a reporting unit may change as enterprises open and close plants, 
buy and sell plants or simply because of changes in the way that an 
enterprise chooses to report to the ARD (Harris, 2005a). To permit analysis 
at the more appropriate plant level, it is therefore necessary to ‘spread back’ 
to the plant those financial variables that are only available in the ARD at 
the reporting unit. This is done using the plant level employment data 
available for all plants using the assumption of constant labour-investment 
ratios and labour productivity levels within reporting units.
11
 
To estimate the impact of receiving an RSA grant, it is, of course, 
necessary to identify which plants received assistance in the ARD. The 
                                                 
11
 Because the variance of the data is lower using this method than if data were available for 
every plant, the standard errors on the estimated coefficients will be artificially reduced. 
However, using reporting unit data is not a solution to this problem as it also reduces the 
variance of the data through the aggregation of potentially disparate plants. 
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SAMIS database, which is maintained by the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills, has data on firms in Great Britain that applied for an 
RSA grant. This includes the postcode, standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code and employment level of the applicant firm and the date on 
which the application was made. For successful applications, the date when 
the payment was made and the value of the grant are also recorded. 
Variables common to both SAMIS and the ARD can then be used to 
identify plants in the ARD that had received an RSA grant. The starting 
point for the linking process was the linkage achieved by Harris (2005b). 
Further links were added on the basis of work done by Criscuolo et al. 
(2009). If a plant in SAMIS had still not been linked, matching was done 
manually using postcodes, SIC codes, employment levels and application 
years. In the end, this process achieved a link from SAMIS to the ARD of 
91.4% of the manufacturing plants that received an RSA grant in Scotland. 
This is higher than the level achieved in previous studies using datasets 
created by combining SAMIS with the ARD (Harris and Robinson, 2004; 
Harris, 2005b; Criscuolo et al., 2009) and therefore provides a firmer basis 
for empirical analysis. 
 
 14 
Variables 
The ARD contains information which allows the construction of a 
number of variables which can be included in xit in equation (4).
12
 The 
Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl, 1950) is a measure of the degree of 
concentration and, under certain assumptions (see, e.g., Cabral, 2000), 
competition within an industry. Intuitively, it would be expected that greater 
competition (which implies a lower Herfindahl index) will pressure firms 
into adopting new technologies and operating more efficiently. However, 
following Schumpeter (1943), it can also be argued that competition will be 
inversely related to productivity if monopoly rents are required for 
management to invest in the R&D which leads to innovations and 
improvements in TFP (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
Spatial spillovers or agglomeration economies are benefits that 
accrue to plants from being located in the vicinity of concentrations of other 
plants. According to Duranton and Puga (2004), the mechanisms which give 
rise to agglomeration economies are the sharing of common pools of assets, 
matching between firms and workers and the transfer of knowledge between 
firms, all of which are facilitated by their spatial concentration. 
Agglomeration economies take two main forms: localisation (or 
Marshallian) externalities, and urbanisation (or Jacobian) externalities. The 
                                                 
12
 Further discussion on why these variables would be expected to determine productivity is 
given in Harris and Moffat (2011). 
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former arise from the concentration of plants from the same industry in a 
given area (Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986). The latter arise 
from diversity in the activities of plants in a particular area (Jacobs, 1970). 
In the analysis below, localisation externalities are measured by a variable 
measuring the proportion of industry output located within the local 
authority. Urbanisation externalities are measured by a variable calculated 
as the number of different SIC codes within the local authority. 
Also included in the model is a foreign ownership dummy. This is 
justified by the observation that, to make it worthwhile for a foreign firm to 
incur the costs of setting up or acquiring a plant in the domestic market, 
foreign firms must possess characteristics that give them a cost advantage 
over domestic firms (Hymer, 1976). These characteristics may include 
specialised knowledge about production or better management, both of 
which would lead to higher TFP. On the other hand, cultural differences 
may cause a lack of understanding between management and labour 
(Dunning, 1988) which could reduce TFP in foreign-owned plants. 
Furthermore, foreign-owned firms may undertake FDI to source technology 
from the host economy rather than to exploit superior technology from the 
home country (Driffield and Love, 2007). Plants owned by foreign owned 
firms that are motivated by technology sourcing are then likely to have 
lower TFP than domestically owned plants (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; 
Cantwell et al., 2004). Foreign-owned plants would also be expected to have 
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lower productivity if foreign-owned firms keep their high value production 
at home and leave lower value added operations to their foreign subsidiaries 
(Doms and Jensen, 1998). 
A single-plant firm dummy, equal to one if that plant is the only 
plant owned by the firm, is also included in equation (4). Multi-plant 
enterprises which serve a large geographic market where transport costs are 
relatively high will benefit from being able to locate plants close to their 
markets (Harris, 1989). Furthermore, single plant firms will be at a 
productivity disadvantage compared to multi-plant firms if technology is 
shared within multi-plant enterprises (Jarmin, 1999). Conversely, multi-
plant firms may be less efficient if principal-agent problems are more severe 
in multi-plant enterprises (Leibenstein, 1966). There may also be significant 
bureaucratic costs to organising production over a large number of plants 
(Chandler, 1962). Finally, single-plant firms may be more innovative and 
flexible because they have access to a higher level of localised knowledge 
than multi-plant firms (Kelley and Harrison, 1990). 
An age variable is included among the covariates to measure 
whether younger plants use more modern vintages of capital embodying 
better technology than older plants or if through learning-by-doing 
productivity increases as the plant ages (e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996). 
Note that the measure of the capital stock used here (see Harris and 
Drinkwater, 2000; Harris, 2005a) is in theory adjusted to take account of 
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vintage effects. Thus the coefficient obtained on the plant age variable 
should be an estimate of only the learning-by-doing effect. In practice 
though, it is unlikely that the capital stock estimates are fully adjusted for 
obsolescence. 
Finally, a time trend is included in equation (1) to account for 
(Hicks-neutral) technical change. This is done to capture the impact on TFP 
of exogenous improvements in technology common to all plants. Further 
detail on all the variables used in the analysis is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 around here 
 Table A1 in the appendix shows the mean of these variables across 
plants that received an RSA grant and plants that did not receive an RSA 
grant. This table shows that RSA grant recipients are larger, in terms of 
output and employment, than plants that did not receive an RSA grant in all 
four sectors. They also have larger capital stocks and use more intermediate 
inputs. They operate in less concentrated industries (as shown by the lower 
value of the Herfindahl Index) and in less diversified areas which have a 
higher proportion of their industry’s output. RSA grant recipients are also 
older, less likely to belong to a multi-plant enterprise and more likely to be 
foreign-owned. It is these differences in characteristics for which the 
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combination of propensity score matching and regression is designed to 
control.
13
 
 
Results 
Rather than performing the analysis using the entire sample, the 
sample is split according to the sophistication of the technology employed in 
the production process. This is done to avoid the imposition of common 
coefficients across disparate industries. In particular, it is undesirable to 
impose common coefficients for labour, intermediate inputs and capital as 
different industries operate with different technologies. The sample is 
therefore split into high-tech, medium high-tech, medium low-tech and low-
tech industries. Plants were organized into these industries according to the 
Eurostat classification of SIC codes (with some minor adjustments).
14
 
Table 2 around here 
The estimated parameters from the probit model used to generate the 
propensity scores are given in the appendix. Table 2 gives the difference in 
the mean of the variables which will be used in the empirical analysis 
between plants that received an RSA grant and plants that did not receive an 
RSA grant. This provides an indication of the extent to which the match, or 
                                                 
13
 Chapter 5.2 of Moffat (2010) provides information on the number and value of RSA 
grants over time and the distribution of these grants across sector within Scotland. 
14
 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf 
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balance, of the covariates is improved across ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ 
groups by moving from the full to the matched sample. In the full sample, 
the differences in the mean of the covariates are statistically significant at 
the 99% level for each variable in each sector with the exception of the time 
variable in the medium low-tech sector. Differences in the mean of the 
covariates are considerably reduced in the matched sample compared to the 
full sample to the extent that they are not statistically significant in the 
medium high-tech and medium low-tech sectors. However, significant 
differences remain in the high-tech and low-tech sectors. This provides 
support for the strategy employed of including covariates in the outcome 
regression to control residual differences in the distribution of the covariates 
in the matched sample. 
Table 3 gives the coefficients obtained from estimation of equation 
(4) using the matched sample. The instruments are lagged three times to 
allow for autocorrelation in the error term which would invalidate 
instruments which are lagged an insufficient number of times. This proved 
to be a sufficient number of lags to avoid rejection of the null of valid 
instruments in the Hansen test for each sector. 
Table 3 around here 
Because the creation of the matched sample involves the removal of 
untreated plants that are dissimilar from treated plants, covariates have a 
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smaller variance in the matched sample which causes their coefficients to 
become less statistically significant.  
The most important coefficient is that associated with the RSA 
dummy. This is negative but not statistically significant in the high-tech and 
medium high-tech manufacturing sectors. In the medium low-tech and low-
tech manufacturing sectors, the coefficient on the RSA dummy is negative 
and statistically significant. The size of the coefficient indicates that, in 
medium low-tech manufacturing, receipt of an RSA grants leads to a fall in 
TFP of 3.3%
15
 while, in low-tech manufacturing, receiving an RSA grant 
reduces TFP by 4.3%. Therefore, the estimated impact of receipt of an RSA 
grant is most negative in those sectors which employ the most basic 
technologies. This may be explained by different rates of obsolescence 
across sectors. If capital becomes obsolete faster in high-tech sectors, new 
capital will be needed to restore a plant to the technological frontier. 
However, in low-tech sectors, where obsolescence occurs at a slower rate, 
the need for new capital is not so pressing. There is therefore more scope for 
RSA-supported investments in capital which lead to an inefficiently high 
level of inputs.
16
 
                                                 
15
 The following conversion is necessary to calculate the marginal effect: 100*(exp(-0.034)-
1)=3.3 
16
 Note that, as discussed above, an attempt has been made to adjust the estimates of the 
capital stock for obsolescence so that the capital stock variable should measure efficiency 
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Having obtained the results from the basic specification in equation 
(4), the specification of the ‘treatment’ dummy was modified in two ways to 
gain a better understanding of how receipt of an RSA grant determines 
productivity. Firstly, rather than assuming that an RSA grant has an impact 
on plant TFP for the duration of the plant’s existence, as is implicit in the 
baseline specification in which the RSA dummy equals one from the year in 
which a grant is received, the RSA dummy was modified so that it only took 
the value of one for a given number of years after the grant was received. 
The marginal effects obtained using different numbers of years are shown in 
Figure 1. Using a dummy that takes the value of one only in the period in 
which the grant is received yields a positive and significant coefficient for 
high-tech plants. However, all other specifications of the RSA dummy give 
coefficients that are not statistically significant which shows that an RSA 
grant has no long-term impact on plant TFP in this sector. 
Figure 1 around here 
 Regardless of the specification used, there is no significant impact 
of receipt of an RSA grant on TFP in medium high-tech while the impact is 
always negative and significant in low-tech manufacturing. The most 
important finding of Figure 1 is that the impact of an RSA grant on plants in 
the medium low-tech sector is not robust to different specifications of the 
                                                                                                                            
units of capital. However, it is doubtful whether the capital stock variable adequately takes 
account of obsolescence, given the problems inherent in estimating rates of obsolescence. 
 22 
RSA dummy. Using a dummy that equals one for 18 years and more after a 
grant is received always gives a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. However, the estimated coefficient is not significant when fewer 
years are used (the exceptions being four and fourteen years). As it would 
be expected that the impact of an RSA grant on TFP would become 
apparent well before 18 years after the grant is received if the coefficient is 
truly measuring a causal impact, it cannot be said that receipt of an RSA 
grant has a significant impact on TFP in this sector. 
Table 4 around here 
Secondly, differences in the impact of receipt of an RSA grant 
between UK and foreign-owned plants were tested for by including an 
interaction variable between the FDI dummy and the RSA dummy. The 
results are provided in Table 4. The RSA dummy was not statistically 
significant for any of the sectors used which suggests that domestically-
owned and foreign-owned plants experience similar impacts on TFP from 
receiving an RSA grant. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to establish the existence of a causal impact of receipt 
of an RSA grant on plant TFP in Scotland using a dataset created by 
merging SAMIS with the ARD. Estimation was performed using a matched 
sample to deal with the consequences of self-selection into the ‘treatment’ 
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group. For high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing, the estimated 
coefficient on the RSA dummy was not statistically significant. This was 
also the case in Criscuolo et al. (2009) and Hart et al. (2008). However, for 
medium low-tech and low-tech manufacturing, receiving an RSA was found 
to reduce TFP although the result for medium low-tech manufacturing was 
found to be not robust to changes in the specification of the RSA dummy.  
This suggests that RSA grants lead plants in low-tech manufacturing, the 
sector which received the highest number of grants, to employ an 
inefficiently high level of inputs. Without such grants to compensate them 
for employing a sub-optimally high level of inputs, they would employ 
fewer inputs but have higher levels of TFP. The existence of such a 
productivity cost is not surprising as, according to the rules of the scheme, 
grants are provided to get firms to do something which they would not 
otherwise do: create or safeguard employment. Whether this negative 
contribution to aggregate productivity should be regarded as a necessary 
evil for the extra employment in the economy is a moot point which is 
worthy of future research.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
RSA 
Dummy variable indicating whether the 
plant received an RSA grant 
SAMIS 
Gross Value Added 
Sales minus intermediate inputs (2000 
prices) 
ARD 
Employment Number of employees within the plant ARD 
Capital 
Plant & machinery capital stock (Harris 
and Drinkwater, 2000, updated) 
ARD 
Age Age of plant in years ARD 
Time Time trend calculated from 1984 base year ARD 
Herfindahl Index 
Herfindahl index of industry concentration 
(calculated at 4-digit SIC level) 
ARD 
Local authority 
industry share 
Share of (4-digit) SIC industry output 
within local authority in which plant is 
located for industry in which plant 
operates 
ARD 
Local authority 
diversification 
Number of (4-digit) SIC codes within local 
authority in which plant is located 
ARD 
FDI 
Dummy variable indicating whether the 
plant is owned by a foreign enterprise 
ARD 
Single 
Dummy variable indicating whether the 
plant is a single-plant enterprise 
ARD 
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Table 2. Difference in variable means for RSA-assisted and non-RSA assisted plants for different sectors, Scottish 
manufacturing 1984-2005 
Sector High-tech Medium high-tech Medium low-tech Low-tech 
Sample Full Matched Full Matched Full Matched Full Matched 
ln(Employment) 
2.09*** -0.12 1.68*** -0.09 1.90*** 0.00 1.50*** -0.03 
(28.95) (-1.58) (33.69) (-1.50) (32.27) (-0.05) (44.62) (-0.93) 
ln(Intermediate Inputs) 
2.61*** -0.38*** 1.82*** -0.08 1.67*** 0.05 1.58*** -0.05 
(30.37) (-3.44) (32.44) (-1.07) (28.20) (0.70) (36.70) (-1.02) 
ln(Capital) 
3.51*** 0.48*** 2.77*** -0.06 2.30*** 0.12 2.06*** -0.09 
(30.20) (4.84) (31.65) (-0.67) (26.29) (1.28) (33.35) (-1.53) 
ln(Herfindahl Index) 
4.99*** 4.83 -0.10*** -0.04 -0.30*** 0.07 5.45*** 5.58 
(3.25) (-1.47) (-4.02) (-1.16) (-10.49) (1.70) (-6.27) (0.61) 
ln(Local Authority 
Industry Share) 
1.05*** 0.34 0.27*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.02 1.55*** 1.27 
(9.15) (-1.50) (6.30) (1.08) (5.29) (0.52) (9.73) (-0.84) 
ln(Local Authority 
Diversification) 
-0.33*** 0.12*** -0.10*** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.04 -0.10*** 0.01*** 
(-12.35) (3.25) (-4.19) (0.82) (-4.70) (1.08) (-3.05) (0.34) 
ln(Age) 
0.66*** 0.39*** 0.67*** 0.03 0.55*** 0.02 0.50*** 0.00 
(18.48) (9.02) (23.37) (0.89) (18.97) (0.57) (25.38) (-0.15) 
Single 
0.21*** -0.10*** 0.08*** 0.02 0.16*** -0.03 0.11*** -0.01 
(11.12) (-2.75) (5.62) (1.10) (10.84) (-1.14) (11.69) (-0.82) 
FDI 
0.31*** 0.05** 0.16*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.02* 
(16.48) (2.03) (11.55) (-0.09) (7.78) (0.40) (11.45) (1.73) 
Time 
0.50*** -0.74* 0.87*** 0.11 0.33 0.33 0.44*** 0.47** 
(1.95) (-2.42) (4.40) (0.41) (1.56) (1.16) (3.17) (2.55) 
         
Number of RSA Grants 89 86 87 196 
‘Treated’ Observations 746 1,129 937 2,198 
‘Untreated’ Observations 2,799 388 8,198 825 9,964 758 24,494 1,844 
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 90/95/99% levels 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
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Table 3. Estimated parameters from estimation of an augmented production 
function using a matched sample, Scottish manufacturing 1984-2005 
Sector High-tech 
Medium 
high-tech 
Medium 
low-tech 
Low-tech 
ln(Employment) 
0.401*** 0.371*** 0.412*** 0.278*** 
(0.102) (0.116) (0.111) (0.068) 
ln(Intermediate 
Inputs) 
0.579*** 0.565*** 0.647*** 0.743*** 
(0.088) (0.081) (0.083) (0.058) 
ln(Capital) 
0.005 0.055 -0.029 -0.029 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.033) (0.036) 
ln(Herfindahl Index) 
-0.004 0.009 0.013 0.018* 
(0.036) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) 
ln(Local Authority 
Industry Share) 
0.011 0.010 0.018 0.009 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.009) 
ln(Local Authority 
Diversification) 
0.007 0.006 -0.037* -0.003 
(0.046) (0.035) (0.019) (0.011) 
ln(Age) 
0.012 -0.051 0.027 0.041 
(0.113) (0.082) (0.051) (0.059) 
Single 
-0.026 -0.012 -0.011 -0.050 
(0.042) (0.024) (0.038) (0.037) 
FDI 
0.112 0.071* 0.028 0.105*** 
(0.075) (0.040) (0.039) (0.034) 
Time 
0.034*** -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
RSA 
-0.019 -0.029 -0.034* -0.044*** 
(0.045) (0.023) (0.018) (0.015) 
     
AR(1) -2.175** -4.289*** -3.526*** -4.123*** 
AR(2) -0.241 -1.690* -1.957* -0.139 
Hansen test 59.78 56.53 68.46 57.12 
Observations 1,134 1,954 1,695 4,042 
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 90%/95%/99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table 4. Estimated parameters from estimation of an augmented production 
function using a matched sample including interaction between RSA and 
FDI, Scottish manufacturing, 1984-2005 
Sector High-Tech 
Medium 
high-tech 
Medium 
low-tech 
Low-tech 
ln(Employment) 
0.393*** 0.369*** 0.412*** 0.279*** 
(0.105) (0.119) (0.112) (0.069) 
ln(Intermediate 
Inputs) 
0.584*** 0.567*** 0.646*** 0.743*** 
(0.088) (0.082) (0.083) (0.058) 
ln(Capital) 
-0.005 0.055 -0.031 -0.031 
(0.072) (0.063) (0.034) (0.036) 
ln(Herfindahl Index) 
-0.001 0.009 0.014 0.018* 
(0.036) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) 
ln(Local Authority 
Industry Share) 
0.013 0.010 0.019 0.010 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.009) 
ln(Local Authority 
Diversification) 
0.002 0.006 -0.037* -0.003 
(0.045) (0.035) (0.020) (0.011) 
ln(Age) 
0.021 -0.050 0.031 0.045 
(0.099) (0.082) (0.054) (0.059) 
Single 
-0.028 -0.012 -0.012 -0.052 
(0.042) (0.024) (0.038) (0.037) 
FDI 
0.070 0.067* 0.041 0.121*** 
(0.071) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) 
Time 
0.033*** -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
RSA 
-0.044 -0.031 -0.030 -0.041*** 
(0.047) (0.025) (0.019) (0.015) 
RSA x FDI 
0.073 0.005 -0.016 -0.026 
(0.080) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037) 
 
 
   
AR(1) -2.127** -4.279*** -3.518*** -4.116*** 
AR(2) -0.252 -1.691 -1.961 -0.160 
Hansen Test 59.55 56.58 69.05 56.89 
Observations 1,134 1,954 1,695 4,042 
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 90%/95%/99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Figure 1. Estimated impact of receipt of an RSA grant on TFP using an RSA 
dummy that takes the value of one for 1 to 33 years after receipt of the 
grant, Scottish Manufacturing, 1984-2005 
 
Squares denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level 
Note that the SAMIS database contains information on RSA recipients back to 1972. 
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Table A1. Mean of logged variables for non-RSA and RSA plants, Scottish manufacturing 1984-2005 
 
High-Tech Medium High-Tech Medium Low-Tech Low-Tech 
 
Non-
RSA 
RSA Total 
Non-
RSA 
RSA Total 
Non-
RSA 
RSA Total 
Non-
RSA 
RSA Total 
Ln(Gross Output) 7.56 9.98 8.07 7.40 9.18 7.62 7.14 8.84 7.28 7.39 8.91 7.51 
Ln(Employment) 3.50 5.59 3.94 3.11 4.80 3.32 2.77 4.67 2.94 3.27 4.77 3.39 
Ln(Intermediate Inputs) 6.98 9.59 7.53 6.77 8.59 6.99 6.55 8.22 6.70 6.75 8.33 6.88 
Ln(Capital) 4.82 8.33 5.56 4.48 7.25 4.82 4.72 7.02 4.92 4.78 6.84 4.95 
Ln(Herfindahl Index) -2.54 -2.44 -2.52 -2.72 -2.84 -2.74 -2.51 -2.83 -2.54 -2.67 -2.78 -2.68 
Ln(Local Authority 
Industry Share) -0.82 -0.23 -0.70 -1.15 -0.88 -1.11 -1.32 -1.13 -1.30 -0.90 -0.65 -0.88 
Ln(Local Authority 
Diversification) 2.73 2.40 2.66 2.75 2.66 2.73 2.54 2.43 2.53 2.53 2.48 2.53 
Ln(Age) 2.27 2.93 2.41 2.31 2.98 2.39 2.43 2.97 2.48 2.50 3.00 2.54 
Single 0.27 0.48 0.32 0.29 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.37 0.23 0.24 0.36 0.25 
FDI 0.27 0.58 0.33 0.25 0.41 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.10 
Time 11.53 12.03 11.64 11.50 12.37 11.61 11.45 11.78 11.47 11.17 11.61 11.20 
Observations 2,799 746 3,545 8,198 1,129 9,327 9,964 937 10,901 24,494 2,198 26,692 
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Table A2. Estimated parameters from probit model used to calculate 
propensity scores, Scottish manufacturing 1984-2005 
Sector High-Tech 
Medium 
high-tech 
Medium 
low-tech 
Low-tech 
ln(Employment) 
0.008 0.205*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 
(0.047) (0.033) (0.032) (0.018) 
ln(Intermediate 
Inputs) 
0.072** 0.035 -0.060** -0.013 
(0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.014) 
ln(Capital) 
0.256*** 0.071*** 0.019 0.005 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) 
ln(Herfindahl Index) 
-0.006 -0.195*** -0.114*** -0.095*** 
(0.041) (0.024) (0.022) (0.016) 
ln(Local Authority 
Industry Share) 
0.025 0.039* 0.035 0.054*** 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) 
ln(Local Authority 
Diversification) 
-0.364*** -0.157*** -0.136*** -0.108*** 
(0.050) (0.037) (0.033) (0.019) 
ln(Age) 
0.188*** 0.397*** 0.341*** 0.224*** 
(0.054) (0.038) (0.039) (0.024) 
Single 
0.700*** 0.219*** 0.222*** 0.373*** 
(0.062) (0.043) (0.044) (0.028) 
FDI 
0.411*** 0.343*** 0.104* 0.223*** 
(0.065) (0.045) (0.056) (0.038) 
Time 
0.031*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
     
Log-likelihood -1163 -2617 -2510 -6247 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.362 0.240 0.214 0.177 
Observations 3,545 9,327 10,901 26,692 
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 90%/95%/99% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
